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We study and solve the problem of distilling secret key from quantum states representing correla-
tion between two parties (Alice and Bob) and an eavesdropper (Eve) via one–way public discussion:
we prove a coding theorem to achieve the “wire–tapper” bound, the difference of the mutual infor-
mation Alice–Bob and that of Alice–Eve, for so–called cqq–correlations, via one–way public com-
munication. This result yields information–theoretic formulas for the distillable secret key, giving
“ultimate” key rate bounds if Eve is assumed to possess a purification of Alice and Bob’s joint state.
Specialising our protocol somewhat and making it coherent leads us to a protocol of entanglement
distillation via one–way LOCC (local operations and classical communication) which is asymptot-
ically optimal: in fact we prove the so–called “hashing inequality” which says that the coherent
information (i.e., the negative conditional von Neumann entropy) is an achievable EPR rate. This
result is well–known to imply a whole set of distillation and capacity formulas which we briefly
review.
I. INTRODUCTION
Entanglement and secret correlation share an “exclu-
siveness” — in the one case towards the total outside
world, in the other towards an entity “Eve” — that has
led quantum information scientists to speculate on a sys-
tematic relation between their theories: the works in
this direction range from building analogies [14] to us-
ing entanglement to prove information theoretic security
of quantum key distribution [49], to attempts to prove
the equivalence of the distillability of secret key and of
entanglement [1, 10].
Of course there are also conceptual differences: while
the task of distilling secret perfect correlation derives
from potential cryptographic applications (and requires a
third, malicious, party to formulate the operational prob-
lem), entanglement is useful for simple transmission tasks
between two perfectly cooperating parties, as exemplified
by dense coding [7] and teleportation [8].
The present paper falls into the third of the above cat-
egories, for we address the two questions, of distilling
secret key from many copies of a quantum state (itself
a generalisation of classical information theoretic work
begun by Maurer [39] and Ahlswede and Csisza´r [2]) by
public discussion and of distilling EPR pairs by local op-
erations and classical communication (LOCC), in a uni-
fied way. To be more precise, after describing a proto-
col for secret key distillation from a state by one–way
public discussion, we show how secrecy codes of a par-
ticular structure can be converted into one–way LOCC
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entanglement distillation protocols achieving the coher-
ent information, as was conjectured for some time under
the name of the “hashing inequality” (after the hash-
ing protocol in [6] which attains the bound for Bell–
diagonal two–qubit states). It is well–known from [33]
that this inequality yields information theoretic char-
acterisations of distillable entanglement under general
LOCC, as well as the quantum transmission capacity,
without, with forward and with bidirectional classical
side channel (the first of these capacity theorems proved
recently by Shor [48], following a heuristic argument of
Lloyd [37], and subseqently in [19]). Our approach is
very close to that of [19], and — as far as secret key dis-
tillation is concerned — the work [11]: while here our re-
source is a three–party quantum state (“static” model),
these papers deal with the “dynamic” analogue, where
the resource is a quantum/wiretap channel.
As for the structure of the paper: the main result of the
cryptographic part is theorem 1 in section II; the form of
the optimal rates is then not hard to obtain, as we shall
show in the detailed discussion. It is theorem 1 which
we return to in the entanglement distillation part: a very
general modification of the coding procedure will give us
theorem 10, the hashing inequality; and as before, the
form of the optimal rates is not hard to get from there.
A reader only interested in entanglement distillation can
thus skip the second part of section II: there the general
form of optimal one–way distillable secret key is derived.
In section III we turn to one–way entanglement distilla-
tion, proving the hashing inequality and exhibiting the
general form of optimal one–way distillation; then in sec-
tion IV the consequences of the hashing inequality are
detailed. Appendices collect the necessary facts about
typical subspaces (A), some miscellaneous lemmas (B)
and miscellaneous proofs (C).
2II. ONE–WAY SECRET KEY DISTILLATION
We will first study and solve the case of cqq–
correlations, i.e., the initial state ρABE has the form
ρABE =
∑
x∈X
P (x)|x〉〈x|A ⊗ ρBEx . (1)
Then n copies of that state can be written(
ρABE
)⊗n
=
∑
xn
Pn(xn)|xn〉〈xn|A ⊗ ρBExn ,
with xn = x1 . . . xn and
|xn〉 = |x1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |xn〉,
ρBExn = ρ
BE
x1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρBExn .
Let X be a random variable with distribition P , and
corresponding to the n copies of ρ consider independent
identically distributed (i.i.d.) realisations X1, . . . , Xn of
X .
A one–way key distillation protocol consists of:
• A channel T : xn −→ (ℓ,m), with range ℓ ∈
{1, . . . , L} and m ∈ {1, . . . ,M}.
• A POVM D(ℓ) = (D(ℓ)m )Mm=1 on Bn for every ℓ.
The idea is that Alice generates T (Xn) = (Λ,K); her
version of the key is K = m, while she sends Λ = ℓ to
Bob. He obtains his K ′ by measuring his system B using
D(ℓ):
Pr{K ′ = m|Λ = ℓ,Xn = xn} = Tr(D(ℓ)m ρBxn).
For technical reasons we assume that the communication
has a rate L ≤ 2nF , for some constant F .
We call this an (n, ǫ)–protocol if
1. Pr{K 6= K ′} ≤ ǫ.
2.
∥∥Dist(K)− 1M 1{1,...,M}∥∥1 ≤ ǫ.
3. There is a state σ0 such that for all m,∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
xn,ℓ
Pr{Xn=xn,Λ=ℓ|K=m}|ℓ〉〈ℓ| ⊗ ρExn− σ0
∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤ ǫ.
We call R an achievable rate if for all n there exist
(n, ǫ)–protocols with ǫ→ 0 and 1n logM → R as n→∞.
(The convention in this paper is that log and exp are
understood to be to basis 2.) Finally define
K→(ρ) := sup{R : R achievable},
the one–way (or forward) secret key capacity of ρ.
Before we can formulate our first main result, we have
to introduce some information notation: for a quantum
state ρ we denote the von Neumann entropy H(ρ) =
−Trρ log ρ, and the Shannon entropy of a probability dis-
tribution P , H(P ) = −∑x P (x) logP (x). If the state is
the reduced state of a multi–party state, like the ρABE
above, we write H(A) = H(ρA), etc. In the particular
case of eq. (1), obviously H(ρA) = H(P ). For a general
bipartite state ρAB define the (quantum) mutual infor-
mation
I(A : B) = H(A) +H(B)−H(AB),
which for the cq–state of eq. (1) is easily checked to be
equal to
H(ρB)−
∑
x
P (x)H(ρBx ),
a quantity known as the Holevo bound [29] and which we
denote I(P ; ρB), reflecting in the notation the distribu-
tion P and the cq–channel with channel states ρBx . We
shall often use the abbreviation I(X ;B) for this latter,
if the states and distribution of the random variable X
are implicitly clear: this latter notation has the advan-
tage that for any U jointly distributed with X , I(U ;B)
makes sense immediately, without our having to write
down a composite state.
Finally, for a tripartite state ρABC , define the (quan-
tum) conditional mutual information
I(A : C|B) := H(AB) +H(BC)−H(ABC) −H(B),
which is non–negative by strong subadditivity [36]. Usu-
ally the state these notations refer too will be clear from
the context; where not we add it in subscript. Observe
that for a classically correlated system B, the conditional
mutual information takes the form of a probability aver-
age over mutual informations: e.g., for the state of eq. (1),
I(B : E|A) =
∑
x
P (x)I(B : E)ρx .
Also for conditional mutual information we make use of
the hybrid notation involving random variables: for ex-
ample, for random variables T and U , jointly distributed
with X , I(U ;B|T ) is the average over T of Holevo quan-
tities as above.
Theorem 1 For every cqq–state ρ,
K→(ρ) ≥ I(X ;B)− I(X ;E).
Proof. The idea is as follows: the state
ρAB =
∑
x
P (x)|x〉〈x|A ⊗ ρBx
contains the description of a cq–channel with channel
states ρx. We will cover “evenly” all typical type classes
of block length n by channel codes Cℓ to transmit ≈
nI(X ;B) bits, most of which are “good” in the sense
that they have small error probability. All of them are
of the kind that the state of E, when taking the average
3over the last ≈ nI(X ;E) bits of the input, is almost a
constant operator, σℓ, independent of the leading bits.
The key distillation scheme works then as follows: on
observing xn, which is typical with high probability, Alice
announces the type of it and a random ℓ, such that xn is
a codeword of the code Cℓ, to Bob. He is able to decode
it with high probability (because the code will be good
with high probability), and they take the leading
≈ n(I(X ;B)− I(X ;E)) bits
of the message as the key. This is uniformly distributed
because the code is entirely within one type class. Eve
knows almost nothing about the key since she only has a
state very close to σℓ, independent of the key.
Figure 1: A schematic view of the anatomy of the code: the
typical sequences are covered by sets Cℓ, which are good trans-
mission codes for B. A magnified view of one Cℓ (to the lower
right) reveals its inner structure: it is composed of Sℓm, which
are good privacy amplification codes against E.
In precise detail: let Q be an n–type (Ultimately we
will only be interested in typical Q, i.e. ‖P −Q‖1 ≤ δ.)
Consider random variables U (ℓms), independent identi-
cally distributed (i.i.d.) according to the uniform dis-
tribution on the type class T nQ (see appendix A), ℓ =
1, . . . , L, m = 1, . . . ,M , s = 1, . . . , S. Let
σ(Q) :=
1
|T nQ |
∑
xn∈T n
Q
ρExn = Eρ
E
U(ℓms) .
We are interested in the probability of various random
events (for 0 < ǫ < 1/2):
ǫ–Evenness: for all xn ∈ T nQ ,
(1− ǫ)LMS|T nQ |
≤
∑
ℓms
1U(ℓms)(x
n) ≤ (1 + ǫ)LMS|T nQ |
,
with the indicator functions 1U(ℓms) on T nQ .
ǫ-Secrecy: for all ℓ,m, the average of ρExn over Sℓm ={
U (ℓms) : s = 1, . . . , S
}
is close to σ(Q):∥∥∥∥∥ 1S ∑
s
ρEU(ℓms) − σ(Q)
∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤ ǫ.
Codes Cℓ are ǫ–good: define the code Cℓ as the col-
lection of codewords
(
U (ℓms)
)
m,s
. We call it ǫ–good if
there exists a POVM (D
(ℓ)
ms)m,s such that
1
MS
∑
ms
Tr
(
ρBU(ℓms)D
(ℓ)
ms
) ≥ 1− ǫ.
Using the Chernoff bound for the indicator functions
1U(ℓms) evaluated at all points in T nQ (lemma 3 and fol-
lowing remarks), we obtain
Pr{ǫ-evenness} ≥ 1− |X |n exp
(
−LMS ǫ
2
2 ln 2|T nQ |
)
. (2)
Proposition 4 gives us (observing MS ≤ |X |n), for every
δ > 0 and sufficiently large n,
Pr{ǫ-secrecy} ≥ 1− 2dn|X |n exp
(
−Sιn ǫ
288 ln2
)
, (3)
with log ι = −I(Q; ρE)− δ.
Finally, proposition 5 yields for every δ > 0 and if
MS ≤ exp(n(I(Q; ρB)− δ)) (n sufficiently large),
∀ℓ Pr{Cℓ ǫ-good} ≥ 1− ǫ. (4)
Since the individual events in this equation are indepen-
dent, another application of the Chernoff bound (to the
indiator function of “ǫ–goodness”) gives,
Pr{A fraction 1− 2ǫ of the Cℓ is ǫ-good}
≥ 1− exp
(
−L ǫ
2
4 ln 2
)
.
(5)
Thus, if we pick
S = exp
[
n
(
I(Q; ρE) + 2δ
)]
,
M = exp
[
n
(
I(Q; ρB)− I(Q; ρE)− 3δ)],
L = exp
[
n
(
H(Q)− I(Q; ρB) + 2δ)],
and observing |T nQ | ≤ exp(nH(Q)), the right hand sides
of eqs. (2), (3) and (5) converge to 1 as n → ∞, and
hence by the union bound alse the conjunction of these
three events approaches unit probability asymptotically.
Thus, for sufficiently large n, there exist codewords
u(ℓms) ∈ T nQ which together have the property of ǫ–
evenness, ǫ–secrecy and that a fraction of at least 1− 2ǫ
of the Cℓ = (u(ℓms))m,s is ǫ–good. Clearly, we can con-
struct such code sets for all types Q, of which there are
at most (n+ 1)|X | many.
4Now, the protocol works as follows: on observing xn
from the source, Alice determines its type Q and sends
it to Bob. If xn is not typical, i.e. if ‖P −Q‖1 > δ, the
protocol aborts here. Otherwise she selects a random ℓ
such that xn is a codeword of Cℓ, as well as random m, s
such that u(ℓms) = xn. (The latter choice of course is
unique most of the time: if Cℓ is a good code, only a
fraction of at most ǫ of the codewords have a collision.)
She informs Bob also of ℓ; if Cl is not ǫ–good the protocol
aborts.
Note that by the ǫ–evenness of the codewords, the state
of ABE conditional on Q and ℓ is
1
MS
∑
m,s
(1± ǫ)|ms〉〈ms|A ⊗ ρBEu(ℓms) . (6)
(By way of notation, “1 ± ǫ” stands for any number in
the interval [1 − ǫ; 1 + ǫ].) Now, since Cℓ is a good code,
Bob can apply the decoding POVM D(ℓ) to his part of
the system, and transform the state in eq. (6) into a state
θ with the property
1
2
∥∥∥∥∥θ − 1MS ∑
m,s
|ms〉〈ms|A ⊗ |ms〉〈ms|B ⊗ ρEu(ℓms)
∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤ 2ǫ.
Both Alice and Bob measure m and end up with a per-
fectly uniformly distributed key of length
n
(
I(Q; ρB)− I(Q; ρE)− 3δ)
≥ n(I(P ; ρB)− I(P ; ρE)− 3δ − δ′),
with probability 1− 3ǫ, where
δ′ = 2δ log(dAdBdE) + 2τ(δ),
with the dimensions dB and dE of Bob’s and Eve’s local
system, respectively. (Recall that Q is typical, and use
the Fannes inequality, stated in appendix B as lemma 17.)
By the above property of θ, Alice and Bob disagree with
probability ≤ ǫ.
Finally, thanks to the ǫ–secrecy, for all ℓ and m,∥∥∥∥∥ 1S ∑
s
ρEu(ℓms) − σ(Q)
∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤ ǫ,
so Eve’s state after the protocol (including her knowledge
of Q ond ℓ) is almost constant, whatever the value of m.
✷
Remark 2 The communication cost of the protocol de-
scribed in the above proof is asymptotically
H(X)− I(X ;B) = H(A|B)
bits of forward communication (per copy of the state): the
information which code Cℓ to apply from Alice to Bob.
Here are the facts we use in the proof:
Lemma 3 (“Operator Chernoff bound” [3]) Let
X1, . . . , XM be i.i.d. random variables taking values
in the operators B(H) on the D–dimensional Hilbert
space H, 0 ≤ Xj ≤ 1 , with A = EXj ≥ α1 , and let
0 < η < 1/2. Then
Pr
 1M
M∑
j=1
Xj 6∈ [(1− η)A; (1 + η)A]

≤ 2D exp
(
−M αη
2
2 ln 2
)
,
where [A;B] = {X : A ≤ X ≤ B} is an interval in the
operator order. ✷
Note that for the case D = 1 this reduces to the
classical Chernoff bound for bounded real random vari-
ables [12]. Also the case of finite vectors of bounded real
random variables is included by considering the matrices
with vector entries on the diagonal and zero elsewhere.
It is essential in the proof of the following result.
Proposition 4 For a cq–channel W : X −→ S(H) and
a type P , let U (j) be i.i.d. according to the uniform dis-
tribution on the type class T nP , j = 1, . . . ,M . Define the
state
σ(P ) =
1
|T nP |
∑
xn∈T n
P
Wnxn = EW
n
U(j) .
Then for every ǫ, δ > 0, and sufficiently large n,
Pr

∥∥∥∥∥∥ 1M
M∑
j=1
WnU(j) − σ(P )
∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
≥ ǫ

≤ 2dn exp
(
−Mιn ǫ
288 ln2
)
,
with log ι = −I(P ;W )− δ.
Proof. The proof is very close to that of the compression
theorem for POVMs [54]. We reproduce a version of the
argument in appendix C. ✷
Proposition 5 (HSW theorem) Consider a cq–
channel W : X −→ S(H) and a type P , and let U (i) be
i.i.d. according to the uniform distribution on the type
class T nP , i = 1, . . . , N . Then for every ǫ, δ > 0 and
sufficiently large n, if logN ≤ n(I(P ;W )− δ),
Pr
{
C = (U (i))Ni=1 is ǫ−good
}
≥ 1− ǫ.
Here we call a collection of codewords ǫ–good if there
exists a POVM (Di)
N
i=1 on H⊗n such that
1
N
N∑
i=1
Tr
(
WnU(i)Di
) ≥ 1− ǫ.
5Proof . This really is only a slight modification of the
Holevo–Schumacher–Westmoreland argument [30, 46]:
we give the proof in appendix C. ✷
This coding theorem puts us in the position to prove
the following formula for the one–way secret key distilla-
tion capacity of a cqq–state:
For conditional distributions Q(u|x) and R(t|u) define
the states
Theorem 6 For very cqq–state ρ,
K→(ρ) = lim
n→∞
1
n
K(1)
(
ρ⊗n
)
,
with
K(1)(ρ) = max
T |U|X
[
I(U ;B|T )− I(U ;E|T )],
where the maximisation runs over all random variables
U depending on X and T depending on U , i.e. there are
channels Q and R such that U = Q(X) and T = R(U),
and the above formula refers to the state
ωTUABE =
∑
t,u,x
R(t|u)Q(u|x)P (x)
|t〉〈t|T ⊗ |u〉〈u|U ⊗ |x〉〈x|A ⊗ ρBEx .
The ranges of U and T may be taken to have cardinalities
|T | ≤ |X | and |U | ≤ |X |2, and furthermore T can be
taken a (deterministic) function of U .
Proof. Let us begin with the converse part, i.e. the in-
equality “≤”: Consider an (n, ǫ)–protocol with rate R;
then by its definition, and using standard information
inequalities and the Fannes inequality lemma 17
nR ≤ H(K) + n(τ(ǫ) + ǫR)
≤ I(K : K ′Λ) + n(2τ(ǫ) + ǫR+ ǫF )
≤ I(K;BΛ) + n(2τ(ǫ) + ǫR+ ǫF )
≤ I(K;BΛ)− I(K;EΛ)
+ n
(
3τ(ǫ) + ǫR+ 2ǫF + ǫ log dE
)
= I(K;B|Λ)− I(K;E|Λ) + nδ
Letting U = (K,Λ) and T = Λ we obtain
R ≤ 1
n
K(1)(ρ) + δ,
with arbitrarily small δ as n→∞.
The proof of the properties of U and T is given in
appendix C.
Now we come to the proof of the direct part, i.e. the
inequality “≥”: it is clearly sufficient to show that, for
given U and T , the rate R = I(U ;B|T ) − I(U ;E|T ) is
achievable. To this end, consider a protocol, where Alice
generates U and T for each copy of the state i.i.d., and
broadcasts T : this leaves Alice, Bob and Eve in n copies
of
ρ˜ =
∑
t,u,x
R(t|u)Q(u|x)P (x)|u〉〈u|A⊗ρBEx ⊗|t〉〈t|B
′⊗|t〉〈t|E′.
Observing
R = I(U ;BB′)− I(U ;EE′),
we can invoke theorem 1, and are done. ✷
Remark 7 Comparing this with the classical analogue
in [2], it is a slight disappointment to see that here we
don’t get a single–letter formula. The reader may want
to verify that the technique used there to single–letterise
the upper bound does not work here, as it introduces con-
ditioning on quantum registers, while our T has to be
classical.
One can clearly also use a general three–party state
ρABE to generate secret key between Alice and Bob:
a particular strategy certainly is for Alice to perform
a quantum measurement described by the POVM Q =
(Qx)x∈X , which leads to the state
ρ˜A
′BE =
∑
x
|x〉〈x|A′ ⊗ TrA
(
ρABE(Qx ⊗ 1BE)
)
.
Then, starting from many copies of the original state
ρ, we now have many copies of ρ˜, and theorem 6 can be
applied. Because we can absorb the channel U |X into the
POVM, we obtain the direct part (“≥”) in the following
statement:
Theorem 8 For every state ρABE,
K→(ρ) = lim
n→∞
K(1)
(
ρ⊗n
)
,
with
K(1)(ρ) = max
Q,T |X
I(X ;B|T )− I(X ;E|T ),
where the maximisation is over all POVMs Q = (Qx)x∈X
and channels R such that T = R(X), and the informa-
tion quantities refer to the state
ωTA
′BE =
∑
t,x
R(t|x)P (x)
|t〉〈t|T ⊗ |x〉〈x|A′ ⊗ TrA
(
ρABE(Qx ⊗ 1BE)
)
.
The range of the measurement Q and the random vari-
able T may assumed to be bounded as follows: |T | ≤ d2A
and |X | ≤ d4A, and furthermore T can be taken a (deter-
ministic) function of X.
Proof. After our remarks preceding the statement of the
theorem, we have only the converse to prove. This will
look very similar to the converse of theorem 6. Even
though we haven’t so far defined what a key distillation
6protocol is in the present context, we can easily do that
now (and check that the procedure above is of this type):
it consists of a measurement POVM Q = (Qℓm)
L,M
ℓ,m=1 for
Alice and the POVMs D(ℓ) for Bob, with the same con-
ditions (1)–(3) as in the first paragraphs of this section,
where as before we assume a rate bound on the public
discussion: L ≤ 2nF . This obviously generalises the def-
inition we gave for cqq–states.
Consider an (n, ǫ)–protocol with rate R; using stan-
dard information inequalities and the Fannes inequality
lemma 17 we can estimate as follows:
nR ≤ H(K) + n(τ(ǫ) + ǫR)
≤ I(K : K ′Λ) + n(2τ(ǫ) + ǫR+ ǫF )
≤ I(K;BΛ) + n(2τ(ǫ) + ǫR+ ǫF )
≤ I(K;BΛ)− I(K;EΛ)
+ n
(
3τ(ǫ) + ǫR+ 2ǫF + ǫ log dE
)
= I(K;B|Λ)− I(K;E|Λ) + nδ
The measurement Q and T (ℓ,m) = ℓ are permissible in
the definition of K(1), hence we obtain
R ≤ 1
n
K(1)(ρ) + δ,
with arbitrarily small δ as n→∞.
It remains to prove the bounds on the range of X and
T for which we imitate the proof of the corresponding
statement in theorem 6: the full argument is given in
appendix C. ✷
Remark 9 Clearly the worst case for Alice and Bob is
when Eve holds the system E of a purification |ψABE〉
of ρAB, because clearly every other extension ρABE of
ρAB can be obtained from the purification by a quantum
operation acting on E.
Our result (at least in principle) characterises those
bipartite states ρAB for which one–way key distillation
is possible at positive rate. We have to leave open the
question of characterising the states for which positive
rates can be obtained by general two–way public discus-
sion (compare the classical case [2, 39, 40, 43]!).
Note that the classical analogue of the “worst case” is
total knowledge of Eve about both Alice’s and Bob’s ran-
dom variables — which makes key distillation totally im-
possible. For quantum states thus, it must be some “non–
classical” correlation which makes positive rates possible;
it is tempting to speculate that a manifestation of entan-
glement is behind this effect.
We do not fully resolve this issue in the present paper;
nevertheless, in a similar vein, we show in the following
section that if ρAB allows one-way distillation of EPR
pairs at positive rates, then our cryptographic techniques
give a construction of an entanglement distillation pro-
tocol by a modification of key distillation protocols of a
particular form.
III. ONE–WAY ENTANGLEMENT
DISTILLATION
Consider an arbitrary state ρAB between Alice and
Bob. In [6] the task of distilling EPR pairs at optimal
rate from many copies of ρ, via local operations and clas-
sical communication (LOCC), was introduced.
A one–way entanglement distillation protocol consists
of
• A quantum instrument T = (Tℓ)Lℓ=1 for Alice. (An
instrument [18] is a quantum operation with both
classical and quantum outputs — it is modelled
in general as a cp–map valued measure; for our
purposes it is a finite collection of cp–maps which
sum to a cptp map.)
• For each ℓ a quantum operation Rℓ for Bob.
We call it an (n, ǫ)–protocol if it acts on n copies of the
state ρ and produces a maximally entangled state
|ΦM 〉 = 1√
M
M∑
m=1
|m〉A ⊗ |m〉B
up to fidelity 1− ǫ:
F
(
ΦM ,
L∑
ℓ=1
(Tℓ ⊗Rℓ)
(
ρ⊗n
)) ≥ 1− ǫ.
Note that we may assume without loss of generality that
Tℓ and Rℓ output states supported on the reduced states
of ΦM on Alice’s and Bob’s system, respectively: other-
wise we could improve the fidelity.
A number R is an achievable rate if there exist, for
every n, (n, ǫ)-protocol, with ǫ→ 0 and 1n logM → R as
n→∞. Finally,
D→(ρ) := sup{R : R achievable}
is the one–way (or forward) entanglement capacity of ρ.
In [6] the case of Bell–diagonal two–qubit states,
ρ = p00Φ
+ + p01Φ
− + p10Ψ
+ + p11Ψ
−,
was considered and proved that D→(ρ) ≥ 1−H({p}), by
a method called “hashing protocol” (this was generalised
recently to higher dimensions in [52]). Concerning lower
bounds not much more is known, but there are numerous
works dealing with upper bounds on the distillable entan-
glement: the entanglement of formation EF (ρ) [6], the
relative entropy of entanglement Ere(ρ) [51], the Rains
bound R(ρ) [42], and the recently introduced squashed
entanglement Esq(ρ) [13].
To connect to the cryptographic setting discussed so
far, construct a purification |ψ〉ABE of ρ, of which we are
particularly interested in its Schmidt form
|ψ〉ABE =
∑
x
√
P (x)|x〉A ⊗ |ψx〉BE .
7Consider the following special strategy for a one–way
secret key distillation protocol, on n copies of the state:
Alice measures xn (i.e. the above Schmidt basis), and ap-
plies the secret key distillation protocol from theorem 1:
it is easy to evaluate the key rate:
I(P ;ψB)− I(P ;ψE) = H(B)−H(E)
= H(B)−H(AB).
By letting Alice and Bob execute this protocol “coher-
ently”, we can prove:
Theorem 10 (Hashing inequality)
D→(ρ) ≥ H(ρB)−H(ρAB).
The right hand side here equals the negative conditional
von Neumann entropy, −H(A|B), a quantity known as
coherent information [45], which we denote (acknowledg-
ing is directionality) Ic(A 〉B). If the state this is refer-
ring to is not apparent from the context, we add it in
subscript: Ic(A 〉B)ρ.
Proof. Recall the structure of the protocol in the proof of
theorem 1: for each typical type Q we have a collection
of codewords u(ℓms), ℓ = 1, . . . , L, m = 1, . . . ,M and s =
1, . . . , S from T nQ satisfying ǫ–evenness, ǫ–secrecy, and a
fraction of at least 1 − 2ǫ of the codes Cℓ =
(
u(ℓms)
)
m,s
are ǫ-good.
The first step of the protocol is that Alice measures
the type Q non–destructively and informes Bob about
the result. The protocol aborts if Q is not typical, i.e. if
‖P −Q‖1 > δ. This leaves the post–measurement state√
1
|T nQ |
∑
xn∈T n
Q
|xn〉A ⊗ |ψxn〉BE .
Define now a quantum operation for Alice, with Kraus
elements
Cℓ =
√
1
1 + ǫ
|T nQ |
LMS
∑
m,s
|ms〉〈u(ℓms)|,
C∅ =
√
1 −
∑
Q,ℓ
C†ℓCℓ,
which we interpret as an instrument with outcomes ℓ and
∅ [18]: Tℓ(σ) = CℓσC†ℓ . This outcome is communicated to
Bob. That these are really permissible Kraus operators
we obtain from the ǫ–evenness condition.
The outcome ∅ (resulting in abortion of the protocol) is
observed with probability at most ǫ (if n is large enough).
The other outcomes ℓ all occur with the probability
γ(Q) = P⊗n(T nQ )
1
1 + ǫ
1
L
,
in which case the output state of the instrument is√
1
MS
∑
ms
|ms〉A ⊗ |ψu(ℓms)〉BE . (7)
(The absence of the 1 ± ǫ factors when compared to the
analogous eq. (6) in the proof of theorem 1) is due to our
having introduced the error event ∅.)
Now, just as in the proof of theorem 1, Bob decodes
m and s, at least if Cℓ is ǫ–good (which fails to happen
with probability only 2ǫ). But he does it coherently, by
introducing an ancilla system B′ in a standard state |0〉
and applying a unitary to extract ms into B, leaving in
B′ whatever is necessary to make the map unitary. This
transforms the state in eq. (7) into a state
|ϑ〉ABB′E =
√
1
MS
∑
ms
|ms〉A⊗
⊗
(√
1− ems|ms〉B|ϕOKℓms〉
B′E
+
√
ems|ϕbadℓms〉
BB′E
)
,
where ems is the probability of the code incorrectly iden-
tifyingms, and |ϕbadℓms〉 is orthogonal to |ms〉|ϕOKℓms〉. Now,
because the code is ǫ–good,
F
(
|ϑ〉,
√
1
MS
∑
ms
|ms〉A ⊗ |ms〉B|ϕOKℓms〉
B′E
)
≥ (1−√ǫ)2
≥ 1− 2√ǫ,
where we have used the Markov inequality: at most a
fraction of
√
ǫ of the ems can be larger than
√
ǫ. Since
the decoding only affects Bob’s registers, but certainly
not E, we have
(1− ems)
(
ϕOKℓms
)E
+ ems
(
ϕbadℓms
)E
= ψEu(ℓms) ,
and hence we can assume that
〈ϕOKℓms|ψu(ℓms)〉 ≥
√
1− ems. (8)
This implies
F
(
|ϑ〉,
√
1
MS
∑
ms
|ms〉A ⊗ |ms〉B|ψu(ℓms)〉B
′E
)
≥ 1− 3√ǫ.
(9)
At this point, Alice and Bob almost have their maximal
entanglement of the m–variable. All that remains is to
be done is to disentangle Eve:
To begin, Alice measures the s–component of her reg-
ister in the Fourier–transformed basis:(
|tˆ〉 =
√
1
S
S∑
s=1
e2πist/S |s〉 : t = 1, . . . , S
)
,
and tells Bob the result t, who applies the phase shift
S∑
s=1
e2πist/S |s〉〈s|
8to the s–component of his register B. This transforms
|ϑ〉ABB′E into a state |Θ〉ABB′E with
F
(
|Θ〉,
√
1
MS
∑
m
|m〉A⊗|ms〉B|ϕOKℓms〉
B′E
)
≥ 1− 3√ǫ,
(10)
invoking the non–decrease of the fidelity under quantum
operations, applied to eq. (9).
Absorbing s into the register B′, the right hand state
in the last equation can be rewritten as
1√
M
∑
m
|m〉A ⊗ |m〉B|ψ˜ℓms〉
B′E
, (11)
with
|ψ˜ℓms〉
B′E
=
1√
S
∑
s
|s〉B′1 |ψˆu(ℓms)〉
B′2E
.
The reduced states of Eve of the |ψ˜ℓms〉
B′E
is
σℓm =
1
S
∑
s
ψEu(ℓms) ,
where we made use of eq. (8), which is, by the ǫ–secrecy,
at trace distance at most ǫ from a state we denoted σ(Q)
in the proof of theorem 1. By lemma 18 in appendix B,
F
(
σℓm, σ(Q)
) ≥ 1− ǫ.
Choosing a purification |ζ〉B′E of σ(Q), this means that
there are unitaries Uℓm on B
′ such that
F
(
(Uℓm ⊗ 1 )|ψ˜ℓms〉, |ζ〉
)
≥ 1− ǫ,
because the mixed state fidelity equals the maximum
pure state fidelity over all purifications of the states and
all purifications are related by unitaries on the purifying
system [35, 50]. Hence, if Bob applies
U :=
∑
m
|m〉〈m| ⊗ Uℓm
to his share of the state, then the state in eq. (11) is
transformed into a state |Ξ〉ABB′E with
F
(
|Ξ〉, 1√
M
∑
m
|m〉A ⊗ |m〉B|ζ〉B′E
)
≥ 1− ǫ.
Of course, he actually works on |Θ〉, so they end up with
the state (1 ⊗U⊗1 )|Θ〉, which has fidelity 1−3√ǫ to |Ξ〉,
hence with eq. (10) we conclude (by simple geometry)
that it has fidelity ≥ 1− 12√ǫ to |ΦM 〉AB ⊗ |ζ〉B
′E .
Nontypical Q, the event ∅ or bad code Cℓ happen with
total probability at most 4ǫ. In the “good” case, Alice
and Bob distill — up to fidelity 1− 12√ǫ — a maximally
entangled state of log Schmidt rank
n
(
I(Q;ψB)− I(Q;ψE)− 3δ)
≥ n(I(P ;ψB)− I(P ;ψE)− 3δ − δ′)
= n
(
H(B)−H(E)− 3δ − δ′).
with δ′ just as at the end of the proof of theorem 1. ✷
Remark 11 The communication cost of the above pro-
tocol is asymptotically
H(A)− I(X ;B) + I(X ;E) = H(A)−H(B) +H(E)
= H(A) +H(E)−H(AE)
= I(A : E)
bits of forward classical communication per copy of
the state: the information which code Cℓ to use, plus
the information from the measurement of the Fourier–
transformed basis (|tˆ〉)t.
Even though at first sight there seems to be little reason
to believe that our procedure is optimal for this resource
(consider for example a separable initial state: Alice will
have mutual information with a purification but clearly
the best thing is to do nothing), it is amusing to see the
quantum mutual information show up here.
It is in fact possible to show that subject to another
optimisation, the quantum mutual information between
Alice and Eve gives indeed the minimum forward com-
munication cost [20].
Example 12 It is interesting to compare our method
to the original hashing protocol of [6], for the case of
mixtures of Bell states
ρ =
1∑
i,j=0
πijΦij ,
with the numbering of the Bell states introduced in [6]:
Φ00 = Φ
+, Φ01 = Φ
−, Φ10 = Ψ
+, Φ11 = Ψ
−.
The purification we use in the proof reads
|ψ〉ABE =
1∑
i,j=0
√
pij |Φij〉AB ⊗ |ij〉E
=
1√
1
(|0〉A|ψ0〉BE + |1〉A|ψ1〉BE),
with
|ψ0〉BE = √p00|0〉B|00〉E +√p01|0〉B|01〉E
+
√
p10|1〉B|10〉E +√p11|1〉B|11〉E ,
|ψ1〉BE = √p00|1〉B|00〉E −√p01|1〉B|01〉E
+
√
p10|0〉B|10〉E −√p11|0〉B|11〉E .
Note that this is indeed a Schmidt decomposition. First
of all, the communication cost of our protocol evaluates
(using the symmetry between A and B) to
I(A : E) = I(B : E)
= H(B) +H(E)−H(BE)
= 1 +H({p})− 1 = H({p}),
which is the same as in [6]. But the way of the hash-
ing protocol is to “hash” information about the iden-
tity of the state in the Bell ensemble into approximately
9≈ nH({p}) of the states, which then are measured locally
and the results communicated. Our protocol in contrast
has two very distinct communication parts: there is the
“code information” (which amounts to error correction
between Alice and Bob, with built–in privacy amplifica-
tion for Eve’s information about the basis state), and
there is the “phase information” from the measurement
in the Fourier transformed basis. The first amounts to
H(X)− I(X ;ψB) = H(p00 + p01, p10 + p11),
while the second is
I(X ;E) = H({p})−H(p00 + p01, p10 + p11).
Our result leads to the general formula for one–way
distillable entanglement:
Theorem 13 For any bipartite state ρAB,
D→(ρ) = lim
n→∞
1
n
D(1)
(
ρ⊗n
)
,
with
D(1)(ρ) := max
T
L∑
ℓ=1
λℓIc(A 〉B)ρℓ ,
where the maximisation is over quantum instruments
T = (T1, . . . , TL) on Alice’s system, λℓ = TrTℓ(ρ
A) and
ρℓ =
1
λℓ
(Tℓ⊗ id)(ρ). The range of ℓ can be assumed to be
bounded, L ≤ d2A, and moreover each Tℓ can be assumed
to have only one Kraus operator: Tℓ(σ) = AℓσA
†
ℓ .
Proof. First, for the direct part, it is sufficient to consider
an instrument T on one copy of the state: if Alice per-
forms the instrument T on each copy and communicates
the result to Bob, they end up with the new state
ρ˜ =
∑
ℓ
λℓρ
AB
ℓ ⊗ |ℓ〉〈ℓ|B
′
.
Observe that
Ic(A 〉BB′)ρ˜ =
∑
ℓ
λℓIc(A 〉B)ρℓ ,
thus application of theorem 10 to ρ˜ gives achievability.
For the converse, consider any one–way distillation
protocol with rate R, and denote Alice’s instrument by
T = (Tℓ)ℓ, Bob’s quantum operations by Rℓ. Write
Ω =
∑
ℓ
(Tℓ ⊗Rℓ)(ρ⊗n) =:
∑
ℓ
λℓΩℓ.
Then, using Fannes inequality lemma 17, the convexity
of the coherent information in the state [36] and quantum
data processing [45],
nR ≤ H(ΩB)−H(ΩAB) + 2n(τ(ǫ) + ǫR)
= Ic(A 〉B)Ω + 2n
(
τ(ǫ) + ǫR
)
≤
∑
ℓ
λℓIc(A 〉B)Ωℓ + 2n
(
τ(ǫ) + ǫR
)
≤
∑
ℓ
λℓIc(A 〉B)ωℓ + 2n
(
τ(ǫ) + ǫR
)
,
where ωℓ =
1
λℓ
(Tℓ ⊗ id)(ρ⊗n). Hence we get
R ≤ 1
n
D(1)(ρ⊗n) + δ′,
with arbitrarily small δ′ as n→∞, and we are done.
As for the bound on L and the structure of T, observe
that if one Tℓ has more than one Kraus element, one
can decompose Tℓ(σ) into a sum of terms AℓjσAℓj : for
the corresponding probabilities λℓ =
∑
j λℓj and for the
post–measurement states λℓρℓ =
∑
j λℓjρℓj . Then by the
convexity of Ic in the state [36],
λℓIc(A 〉B)ρℓ ≤
∑
j
λℓjIc(A 〉B)ρℓj .
By the polar decomposition and invariance of Ic under
local unitaries we may further assume that Aℓ ≥ 0, i.e.
Aℓ =
√
A†ℓAℓ; in this form the whole instrument is ac-
tually described by the POVM
(
A2ℓ
)
ℓ
, and each POVM
corresponds to an instrument by taking as the Aℓ the
square roots of the POVM operators.
Now, invoking a theorem of Davies [17] (which actu-
ally is another application of Caratheodory’s theorem,
lemma 20), any POVM is a convex combination of ex-
tremal POVMs, which have at most d2A non–zero ele-
ments each, and this convex decomposition clearly car-
ries over to the instruments: T =
∑
j πjTj . Since then∑
ℓ λℓIc(A 〉B)ρℓ is the same convex combination of sim-
ilar such terms for the instruments Tj , at least one of
these gives a higher yield
∑
ℓ λℓjIc(A 〉B)ρℓ : note that
the cp–maps of Tj are scalar multiples of the Tℓ, hence
the output state of Tj with classical result ℓ is ρℓ. ✷
IV. QUANTUM AND ENTANGLEMENT
CAPACITIES
Horodecki3 [33] have observed that the hashing in-
equality implies information theoretic formulas for a
number of quantum capacities and the distillable entan-
glement:
In particular, the quantum capacity of a quantum
channel, either unassisted or assisted by forward or two–
way communication is given by a formula involving coher-
ent information (where we indicate the assisting resource
in the subscript):
Theorem 14 Let T : B(HA) −→ B(HB) be any quan-
tum channel. Then,
Q∅(T ) = Q→(T ) = lim
n→∞
1
n
max
|ψ〉
Ic(A
′ 〉Bn)ω ,
with any pure state ψ on A′An and the state
ω = (id⊗ T )⊗n(ψA′A).
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Furthermore,
Q↔(T ) = lim
n→∞
1
n
sup
|ψ,V 〉
Ic(A
′ 〉Bn)ω,
with any pure state ψ on A′An, two–way LOCC operation
V and the state
ω = V
[
(id⊗ T )⊗n(ψA′A)
]
.
Proof. See [33]. That forward communication does not
help was proved in [5], and that the right hand side is an
upper bound to Q∅ was shown in [37, 45].
The idea of achievability is to distill the state ω and
then use teleportation — this involves forward communi-
cation but either it is free or the whole procedure includ-
ing the distillation and teleportation uses only forward
communication, which by [5] can be removed.
In [33] a similar formula (involving a coherent informa-
tion Ic(B 〉A)σ) was proposed for the quantum capacity
with classical feedback. However, the proof as indicated
above does not work in this case: indeed we may use
the back–communication to help distillation, but tele-
portation needs a forward communication, so we end up
with a quantum channel code utilising two–way classi-
cal side communication, which is not known to be re-
ducible to just back–communication: in fact, the results
of Bowen [9] might be taken as indication that for the
erasure channel the capacities with feedback and with
two–way side communication are different. ✷
We have already given a formula for the distillable en-
tanglement using one–way LOCC in theorem 13:
Theorem 15 For any state ρAB,
D(ρ) = lim
n→∞
1
n
sup
V
Ic(A
′ 〉B′)ω ,
with any two–way LOCC operation V and the coherent
information refers to the state ω = V
(
ρ⊗n
)
.
Proof. For the direct part (“≥”) it is obviously sufficient
to consider any two–way LOCC operation V on the bi-
partite system, which applied to ρ gives a state σ. Doing
that for n copies of ρ, application of theorem 10 shows
that we can distill EPR pairs at rate Ic(A
′〉B′)σ from
this.
Conversely, let V0 be a two–way LOCC producing a
state Ω with ‖Ω−ΦM‖1 ≤ ǫ, nR = logM . Without loss
of generality we may assume that Ω is supported within
the tensor product of the supports of the reduced states
of ΦM . Thus,
nR ≤ H(ΩB)−H(ΩAB) + 3n(ǫR+ τ(ǫ))
= Ic(A 〉B)Ω + 3n
(
ǫR+ τ(ǫ)
)
≤ sup{Ic(A 〉B)V (ρ⊗n) : V two–way LOCC}
+ 3n
(
ǫR+ τ(ǫ)
)
,
and we are done. ✷
It was shown furthermore in [33] that for an ensemble
{pi, ρi} of bipartite pure states the hashing inequality
implies
∆D :=
∑
i
piD(ρi)−D(ρ)
≤ ∆I := H(ρ)−
∑
i
piH(ρi).
This inequality was first exhibited in [23] for a class of
examples, and conjectured to be true in general. Note
that the inequality is trivially true (using only concavity
of the entropy) for the loss of coherent information on
the left hand side.
History and relation to other work:
The coherent information made its appearance in [45]
where its relation to quantum channel capacity was con-
jectured and many of its properties proved. Indepen-
dently [37] proposed this quantity and a heuristic for a
proof which however fell short of a proof. Only recently
Hamada [26] succeeded in giving a lower bound on quan-
tum channel capacity in terms of coherent information
— still with a crucial restriction to stabiliser codes. It
took until [48] for a full proof to be found — but then
quite quickly one of us [19] discovered a proof based on
private information transmission, an idea inspired by the
work of Schumacher and Westmoreland [47].
Regarding entanglement distillation, the hashing in-
equality appears to have been a folk conjecture from the
publication of [6] on, which however has received much
less attention than the quantum channel coding problem.
It was codified as an important conjecture in [33].
While completing the writing of the present paper we
learned of the work [34], in which it is shown that the
proof by random coding of the channel capacity theorem
can be used to obtin the hashing inequality. It may be in-
teresting to compare the proofs [34, 48] for the achievabil-
ity of the coherent information to ours and [19]. While
we, on the face of it, take a detour via secret key distil-
lation, the final procedure can be argued more direct: in
particular, we don’t require the “double blocking” which
in the other approaches seem necessary to reduce to a sit-
uation in which Alice’s end is in a maximally mixed state.
Thus, presumably, our codes achieve rates approaching
the coherent information more quickly, i.e. for smaller
block length.
V. CONCLUSION
Our findings not only transport an existing classi-
cal theory of distilling secret key from prior correlation
(Maurer [39], Ahlswede and Csisza´r [2], and follow–up
work) to the quantum case, but also link this subject to
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entanglement distillation in an operational way: a co-
herent implementation of the basic secret key distilla-
tion protocol yielded an entanglement distillation proto-
col achieving the coherent information — this then im-
plies information theoretic formulas for distillable entan-
glement and quantum capacities.
We want to draw the reader’s attention to several open
question that we have to leave: first of all, are there
states for which D→(ρ) < K→(ρ)? Are there maybe even
bound entangled states with positive key rate? A first
step might be to find states such that D(1)(ρ) < K(1)(ρ).
Note that the potential gap between K→ and D→ comes
from the possibility to have more general measurements
at Alice’s side than the complete von Neumann measure-
ment in the Schmidt basis that was our starting point
in the proof of theorem 10 (actually any complete von
Neumann measurement would do): namely, in key dis-
tillation, a viable option for Alice is to discard part of
her state (corresponding to using higher rank POVM el-
ements), but keep that part secret from Eve all the same;
while in entanglement distillation, ‘Eve” is everything ex-
cept Alice and Bob, so it is as if she would get the parts
Alice decided to toss away.
A second group of open questions: in general, the op-
timisations in theorems 6, 8 and 13 are quite nasty, most
so because they involve a limit of many copies of the
state. In the classical theory of secret key distillation, a
single–letter formula for the optimal one–way key rate is
proved in [2], so there might be hope at least for theo-
rem 6. In contrast, the optimal rate of two–way protocols
or even a procedure to decide if it is nonzero is still to be
found (see the very well–informed reviews [31] and [32]),
which is why we concentrate on one–way protocols for
now. It is known that distillability of entanglement may
be absent for a single copy of a state, but could appear
for collective operations on several copies (see again the
review [32], sections 6.3 and 7.2 and references therein),
so there are only limited possibilities for making theo-
rem 13 into a single–letter formula. Note in particular
that the results of [22] — see also the discussion of Bar-
num, Nielsen and Schumacher [45] where the failure of
subadditivity for the coherent information is observed —
imply that single–letter maximisation of the coherent in-
formation will certainly not achieve the optimum distill-
ability. It would therefore be good to have at least an a
priori bound on the number n of copies of the state which
we have to consider to have D(1)(ρ⊗n) within, say ǫ, of
the optimal rate. In general, good single–letter lower and
upper bounds [13] are still wanted!
Finally, we would like to know what the pub-
lic/classical communication cost is of distilling secret key
and entanglement, respectively, in particular in the one–
way scenario (which at any rate seems to be the one
open to analysis). More generally, if we limit the amount
of communication, can we determine the optimal dis-
tillation rates (see [21] for the communication cost of
common randomness distillation)? In the entanglement
case this should link up with initial efforts to understand
the communication cost of various state transformation
tasks [4, 27, 28, 38]. A study concerning the forward
communication cost of entanglement distillation is in per-
paration [20].
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Appendix A: TYPES AND TYPICAL SUBSPACES
The following material can be found in most textbooks
on information theory, e.g. [15, 16], or in the original
literature on quantum information theory [44, 46, 53].
For strings of length n from a finite alphabet X , which
we generically denote xn = x1 . . . xn ∈ Xn, we define the
type of xn as the empirical distribution of letters in xn:
i.e., P is the type of xn if
∀x ∈ C P (x) = 1
n
|{k : xk = x}|.
It is easy to see that the total number of types is upper
bounded by (n+ 1)|X |.
The type class of P , denoted T nP , is defined as all
strings of length n of type P . Obviously, the type class
is obtained by taking all permutations of an arbitrary
string of type P .
The following is an elementary property of the type
class:
(n+ 1)−|X | exp
(
nH(P )
) ≤ |T nP | ≤ exp(nH(P )), (A1)
with the (Shannon) entropy H(P ).
For δ > 0, and for an arbitary probability distribution
P , define the set of P–typical sequences as
T nP,δ :=
{
xn :
∣∣∣∣− 1n logP⊗n(xn)−H(P )
∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ} .
By the law of large numbers, for every ǫ > 0 and suffi-
ciently large n,
P⊗n(T nP,δ) ≥ 1− ǫ. (A2)
Furthermore:
|T nP,δ| ≤ exp
(
n(H(P ) + δ)
)
, (A3)
|T nP,δ| ≥ (1− ǫ) exp
(
n(H(P )− δ)). (A4)
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For a (classical) channelW : X −→ Y (i.e. a stochastic
map, taking x ∈ X to a probability distribution Wx on
Y) and a string xn ∈ Xn of type P we denote the output
distribution of xn in n independent uses of the channel
by
Wnxn =Wx1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Wxn .
Let δ > 0, and define the set of conditonal W–typical
sequences as
T nW,δ(xn) :=
{
yn :
∣∣∣∣− 1n logWnxn(yn)−H(W |P )
∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ} ,
where H(W |P ) =∑x P (x)H(Wx) is the conditional en-
tropy.
Once more by the law of large numbers, for every ǫ and
sufficiently large n,
Wnxn
(T nW,δ(xn)) ≥ 1− ǫ. (A5)
Furthermore:∣∣T nW,δ(xn)∣∣ ≤ exp(n(H(W |P ) + δ)), (A6)∣∣T nW,δ(xn)∣∣ ≥ (1− ǫ) exp(n(H(W |P )− δ)). (A7)
All of these concepts and formulas have analogues as
“typical projectors” Π for quantum state: by virtue of
the spectral decomposition, the eigenvalues of a density
operator can be interpreted as a probability distribution
over eigenstates. The subspaces spanned by the typi-
cal eigenstates are the “typical subspaces”. The trace of
a density operator with one of its typical projectors is
then the probability of the corresponding set of typical
sequences.
Notations like Πnρ,δ etc. should be clear from this.
There is only one such statement for density operators
that we shall use, which is not of this form:
Lemma 16 (Operator law of large numbers) Let
xn ∈ Xn be of type P , and let W : X −→ S(H) be a
cq–channel. Denote the average output state of W under
P as
ρ =
∑
x
P (x)Wx.
Then, for every ǫ > 0 and sufficiently large n,
Tr
(
WnxnΠ
n
ρ,δ
) ≥ 1− ǫ.
Proof. See [53], Lemma 6. ✷
Appendix B: MISCELLANEOUS FACTS
This appendix collects some standard facts about var-
ious functionals we use: entropy, fidelity and trace norm.
Lemma 17 (Fannes [24]) Let ρ and σ be states on a
d–dimensional Hilbert space, with ‖ρ − σ‖1 ≤ δ. Then∣∣H(ρ)−H(σ)∣∣ ≤ δ log d+ τ(δ), with
τ(δ) =
{
−δ log δ if δ ≤ 1/4,
1/2 otherwise.
Note that τ is a monotone and concave function. ✷
Lemma 18 ([25]) Let ρ and σ be any two states on a
Hilbert space. Then
1−
√
F (ρ, σ) ≤ 1
2
‖ρ− σ‖1 ≤
√
1− F (ρ, σ).
✷
Lemma 19 (Gentle measurement [53]) Let ρ be a
(subnormalized) density operator, i.e. ρ ≥ 0 and Trρ ≤
1, and let 0 ≤ X ≤ 1 . Then, if Tr(ρX) ≥ 1− λ,∥∥∥√Xρ√X − ρ∥∥∥
1
≤
√
8λ.
✷
Lemma 20 (Caratheodory’s theorem [55], 1.6)
Let v1, . . . , vn be points in a d–dimensional R–vector
space, and let p(1), . . . , p(n) be probabilities (i.e.,
non–negative and summing to 1. Then the convex
combination
v =
n∑
i=1
p(i)vi
can be expressed as a convex combination of (at most)
d+ 1 of the vi.
As a consequence, there exist probability distributions
pj on {1, . . . , n} and probability weights λj such that for
all j,
v =
n∑
i=1
pj(i)vi,
∣∣supp pj∣∣ ≤ d+ 1.
✷
Appendix C: MISCELLANEOUS PROOFS
Proof of proposition 4. The proof follows closely the
argument of [54] and of [3]: begin by constructing the
typical projectors Πxn of the Wxn , which, for x
n of type
P , is defined as the sum of the eigenstate projectors of
Wxn with eigenvalues in the interval[
exp
(−n(H(W |P ) + δ)); exp(−n(H(W |P )− δ))] ,
with the conditional entropy H(W |P ) =∑
x P (x)H(Wx). For sufficiently large n, by the
law of large numbers, Tr(WxnΠxn) ≥ 1− ǫ. Now define
ωxn := ΠΠxnW
n
xnΠxnΠ,
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where Π is the typical projector of ρ =
∑
x P (x)Wx, i.e.
the sum of the eigenstate projectors with eigenvalues in
the interval[
exp
(−n(H(ρ) + δ)); exp(−n(H(ρ)− δ))] .
These concepts are taken from [44] and [46], but see also
appendix A. By the law of large numbers, for sufficiently
large n,
Tr(WxnΠ) ≥ 1− ǫ2/8.
From this and the gentle measurement lemma 19, we get
∥∥ωxn −Wxn∥∥1 ≤ 2ǫ. (C1)
The strategy is now to apply the operator Chernoff bound
to the ωxn : they are supported on a subspace of dimen-
sion ≤ exp(n(H(ρ) + δ)), and are all upper bounded by
exp
(−n(H(W |P )− δ))Π.
The only remaining obstacle is that we need a lower
bound on
ω =
1
|T nP |
∑
xn∈T n
P
ωxn .
To this end, let Π̂ be the projector onto the sub-
space spanned by eigenvectors of ω with eigenvalues
≥ exp(−n(H(ρ)− 2δ)). In this way, for sufficiently large
n,
Tr(ωΠ̂) ≥ 1− ǫ.
Defining the operators
ω̂xn := Π̂ωxnΠ̂,
we can now apply lemma 3 to the (rescaled) ω̂U(j) , and
get
Pr
 1M
M∑
j=1
ω̂U(j) 6∈
[
(1± ǫ)Π̂ωΠ̂]

≤ 2dn exp
(
−M exp(−n(I(P ;W ) + 3δ)) ǫ2
2 ln 2
)
.
(C2)
But
Ω :=
1
M
M∑
j=1
ω̂U(j) ∈
[
(1± ǫ)Π̂ωΠ̂]
implies
∥∥Π̂(Ω− ω)Π̂∥∥
1
≤ ǫ, which in turn implies∥∥Π̂ΩΠ̂− ω∥∥
1
≤ 2ǫ. (C3)
In particular we get, invoking eq. (C1),
TrΩ ≥ Trω − 2ǫ ≥ 1− 4ǫ,
Hence, with the gentle measurement lemma 19 ap-
pendix B, we obtain∥∥Π̂ΩΠ̂− Ω∥∥
1
≤
√
32ǫ. (C4)
Combining eqs. (C3) and (C4) via the triangle inequality
gives ∥∥Ω− ω∥∥
1
≤ 2ǫ+
√
32ǫ, (C5)
and using eq. (C1) to replace ωxn by W
n
xn in both above
operators, we get finally∥∥∥∥∥∥ 1M
∑
j
WnU(j) − σ(P )
∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤ 6ǫ+
√
32ǫ ≤ 12√ǫ.
The complement of this event has probability smaller
than eq. (C2), and since δ was arbitrary we obtain our
claim. ✷
Proof of proposition 5. In [46], it is proved that selecting
N ′ = 2(n+ 1)|X | exp
(
n(I(P ;W )− δ))
codewords u(i) at random, i.i.d. according to P⊗n, one
can construct a canonical decoding POVM such that for
the expectation (over the code CHSW) of the average error
probability, pE , goes to zero:
〈pE〉CHSW ≤ 9ǫ+N ′ exp
(−n(I(P ;W )− δ/2)). (C6)
(See [46], eq. (34).) The first thing we note is that (for
sufficiently large n) ǫ = exp(−γn) for a constant γ > 0
depending on δ: this follows by inspection of section III
of [46], where ǫ is introduced as the loss of probability
mass by removing non–typical contributions. As non–
typicality is defined as large deviation events for a sum
of independent random variables, of the form
logλxn =
∑
k
logλxk ,
the Chernoff bound allows us to put exponential bounds
on the non–typical mass.
Hence eq. (C6) can be rewritten, for sufficiently large
n,
〈pE〉CHSW ≤ exp(−nβ), (C7)
with some β > 0.
We want to show that CHSW ∩ T nP is a good approx-
imation to a random code from the type class T nP . Of
course, it is not quite that, if only because it has a vari-
able number of codewords! There is an easy fix to this
problem: define, with N = exp
(
n(I(P ;W )− δ)),
C := First N elements of CHSW ∩ T nP ,
which makes sense because we can put the codewords in
the order we select them. If the intersection is too small,
define C to be empty.
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First of all, let us bound the error probability of C:
pE(C) ≤ 1
N
∑
u(i)∈T n
P
(
1− Tr(Wnu(i) )Di
)
≤ 1
N
N ′∑
i=1
(
1− Tr(Wnu(i) )Di
)
=
N ′
N
pE(CHSW)
(C8)
Now, that |CHSW∩T nP | < N , happens extremely rarely:
because P⊗n(T nP ) ≥ (n+1)−|X |, the expected cardinality
of the intersection is larger than 2N , for sufficiently large
n. But then, using the Chernoff bound,
Pr
{∣∣CHSW ∩ T nP ∣∣ < N} ≤ exp(−N ′ 18 ln 2(n+ 1)|X |
)
≤ exp(−N/4).
By symmetry, it is clear that conditional on C 6= ∅, the
code C is a uniformly random code of N words from T nP ,
i.e. it can be described by i.i.d. and uniformly picking
codewords.
Hence, denoting by C˜ a truly random code of N words
from T nP , we have
1
2
∥∥∥Dist(C)−Dist(C˜)∥∥∥
1
≤ exp(−N/4).
Observe that the left hand side is the total variational dis-
tance of distributions. Thus, putting this together with
eqs.(C8) and (C7), we obtain
〈pE〉C˜ ≤ 〈pE〉C + exp(−N/4)
≤ 2(n+ 1)|X | exp(−nβ) + exp(−N/4)
≤ exp(−nβ/2),
for sufficiently large n. But this in turn implies that
Pr
{
pE(C˜) > exp(−nβ/4)
} ≤ exp(−nβ/4),
by the Markov inequality. ✷
Proof of range bounds in theorem 6. Here we prove that
we may assume that T is a deterministic function of U ,
|T | ≤ |X | and |U | ≤ |X |2:
Observing
I(U ;B|T )− I(U ;E|T ) = H(B|T )−H(B|UT )
− [H(E|T )−H(E|UT )],
we aim at writing the four conditional entropies on the
right as averages over similar such quantities but with
limited range of U and T . To this end, observe that the
channels Q and R induce a probability distribution q(ut)
on the values ut of U˜ := UT (of which T clearly is a
deterministic function), and that for each ut there is the
conditional distribution Put on X :
Put(x) = Pr{X = x|U = u, T = t},
which has the property
∑
ut q(ut)Put = P . With these
notations,
H(B|UT ) =
∑
ut
q(ut)S
(
ρBut
)
, where
ρBut =
∑
x
Put(x)ρ
B
x ,
and similarly for H(E|UT ).
For each t, let q(t) =
∑
u q(ut), which allows us to write
down the conditional distribution q(·|t) on the points ut:
q(ut′|t) =
{
1
q(t)q(ut) for t
′ = t,
0 otherwise.
With this, the conditional distribution Pt on X can be
written
Pt = Pr{X = x|T = t} =
∑
u
q(u|t)Put,
for which clearly
∑
t q(t)Pt = P . This allows us to write
H(B|T ) =
∑
t
q(t)S
(
ρBt
)
, where
ρBt =
∑
x
Pt(x)ρ
B
x ,
and similarly for E.
Now, invoking Caratheodory’s theorem, lemma 20, we
can write, for all t,
q(·|t) =
∑
j
λj|tqj(·|t), (C9)
with probabilities λj|t and conditional distributions qj
such that for all j,∑
ut′
qj(ut
′|t)Put′ = Pt (C10)
and |supp qj(·|t)| ≤ |X |. Another application of
Caratheodory’s theorem gives a convex decomposition
q =
∑
k
µkqk, (C11)
such that the support of all the qk has cardinality ≤ |X |
and for all k, ∑
t
qk(t)Pt = P. (C12)
Eqs. (C9) and (C11) define random variables J and K,
respectively: by eqs. (C10) and (C12), for each value
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JK = jk the conditional distribution of T and U˜ define
variables Tjk|U˜jk|X , and so
H(B|T )−H(E|T ) = H(B|TJ)−H(E|TJ)
=
∑
jk
Pr{JK = jk}[H(B|Tjk)−H(E|Tjk)].
In the same way,
−H(B|UT ) +H(E|UT ) = −H(B|U˜JK) +H(E|U˜JK)
=
∑
jk
Pr{JK = jk}[−H(B|U˜jk) +H(E|U˜jk)].
Hence there exist j and k such that
I(U ;B|T )− I(U ;E|T ) ≤ I(U˜jk;B|Tjk)− I(U˜jk;E|Tjk),
and U˜jk and Tjk satisfy the range constraints. ✷
Proof of range bounds in theorem 8. Here we prove that
we may assume that T is a deterministic function of X ,
|T | ≤ d2A and |X | ≤ d4A:
Denote the POVM elements of the measurement pro-
ducing x and t by Pxt, and introduce the coarse–grained
operators Pt =
∑
x Pxt. To decompose the POVM using
convexity arguments, we rewrite the completeness condi-
tions as
1
dA
1 =
∑
t
TrPt
dA
Pt
TrPt
=:
∑
t
q(t)πt,
πt =
∑
x
TrPxt
TrPt
Pxt
TrPxt
=:
∑
xt′
q(xt′|t)πxt′ .
Using Caratheodory’s theorem, lemma 20, we can write
q =
∑
k
µkqk, (C13)
with distributions qk of support ≤ d2A and such that for
all k, ∑
t
qk(t)πt =
1
dA
1 . (C14)
Using Caratheodory’s theorem once more, we obtain, for
each t, a decomposition
q(·|t) =
∑
j
λj|tqj(·|t), (C15)
with conditional distributions qj(·|t) of support ≤ d2A and
such that for all j,
∑
xt′
qj(xt
′|t)πxt′ = πt. (C16)
Now, let X˜ := XT , which T clearly is a function of.
Then, eqs. (C13) and (C15) define random variables J
and K, respectively: by eqs. (C14) and (C16), for each
value JK = jk we have a POVM P (jk) (whose output
variable we denote X˜jk the function T of which we denote
Tjk). Then (compare the previous proof),
H(B|T )−H(E|T ) = H(B|TJ)−H(E|TJ)
=
∑
jk
Pr{JK = jk}[H(B|Tjk)−H(E|Tjk)].
−H(B|XT ) +H(E|XT ) = −H(B|X˜JK) +H(E|X˜JK)
=
∑
jk
Pr{JK = jk}[−H(B|X˜jk) +H(E|X˜jk)].
Hence there exist j and k such that
I(X ;B|T )− I(X ;E|T ) ≤ I(X˜jk;B|Tjk)− I(X˜jk;E|Tjk),
and X˜jk and Tjk satisfy the range constraints. ✷
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